

Profiling the President: explaining Donald Trump's nationalistic foreign policy decisions using Leadership Trait Analysis and Operational Code Analysis

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Biography

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Abstract

How does an individual leader's personality and beliefs shape a country's foreign policies? Donald Trump has promised to put America First by disrupting the liberal international system in favour of a nationalistic isolationism. His violation of international norms and close friendship with rogue leaders have led many to question his psychological fitness to be president. The research on foreign policy analysis lacks a systematic examination linking the personalities and beliefs of leaders to the hyper-nationalistic policies they adopt. This article conducts at-a-distance content analysis, specifically Leadership Trait Analysis and Operational Code Analysis, on US President Donald Trump in order to explain four puzzling nationalistic foreign policies.

Keywords: [Leadership style](#); [Personality](#); [Nationalism](#); [Trump](#); [Leadership Trait Analysis](#); [Operational Code Analysis](#)

Introduction

Those who framed the United States Constitution created, by deliberate design, a constrained government (Mastanduno, 2015, p. 227). They were aware of the perils involved in the abuse of political power and so sought to disperse it with a system of 'checks and balances' to ensure that no single person accumulated enough power to threaten the integrity of democracy (Ikenberry and Trubowitz, 2015). In George Washington's farewell address, he warned against allowing a single person or minority of elites to undermine fundamental principles, even if it answers popular demands in the short term. Specifically, he forewarned: 'Cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.'¹ It is plausible to argue that,

even back then, America's founding fathers recognised that "who leads matters" and knew there was a possibility that the wrong kind of leader could be elected one day. This article focuses on the psychology of the individual who has the authority to make foreign policy choices for the United States – the president. Of particular concern is how a president's individual beliefs and personality traits influence foreign policy choices.

The stunning 2016 US presidential election of Donald Trump resulted in celebration from his loyal base of supporters and feelings of apprehension from much of the international community. The basis for both of these reactions was clear: a new type of leader had been elected (Carter and Chiozza, 2018). Trump campaigned on a nationalist nostalgia (*Make America Great Again*), which Stephen Walt argues helped win him the White House against the odds, and which formed the basis for his protectionist and anti-immigration foreign policies (Walt, 2019). Since taking office, Trump made a series of executive decisions with far-reaching consequences. His demand that a wall be built on the southern border, which he claimed Mexico would pay for, has tarnished relations with Mexico and South American allies (Powaski, 2019, p. 36). His isolationist beliefs culminated in the withdrawal of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris Agreement on climate change, and the Iran nuclear deal (Goldgeier and Saunders, 2018). He imposed trade tariffs on close trade partners, such as Canada, Mexico and the European Union, and started a trade war with China (Powaski, 2019, p. 240). He single-handedly dismantled the G-7 summit by insulting Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, calling him 'weak' and 'dishonest' and demanding that Russia be readmitted (Powaski, 2019, p. 250). He, instead, flew to Singapore to meet with North Korean tyrant Kim Jong Un, whom he characterised as a 'very talented man' (Macdonald, 2018). His hostility towards US allies and reverence of rogue leaders reflects his self-image as a dealmaker. Some of his actions appear highly narcissistic and seem to serve no political purpose beyond putting him in the spotlight. His advisors and allies have been seemingly unable to talk Trump out of damaging the liberal international order that the US has led for decades in favour of a nationalistic isolationism (Macdonald, 2018).

Studying a US president requires unique methods, as they are not easily available or willing to be interviewed for psychological analysis (Hermann, 2003). One way of learning more about decision-makers, which does not require their cooperation, is by examining what they say using "at-a-distance" measures. A leader's speech acts can be analysed by statistical discourse analysis, in which traits and beliefs are correlated with the frequency of associated words (Hermann, 1980). This article combines Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) and Operational Code Analysis (OCA) to uncover a causal linkage between Donald Trump's individual psychological traits and his political behaviour. This research goes even deeper and asks the following question: *Do the individual-level personality traits and beliefs of Donald Trump have a causal effect on the increasingly nationalistic foreign policies adopted under his administration?* Intuitively, leaders seem crucial to understanding the type of foreign policy a state adopts. Yet, demonstrating how their personality traits and core beliefs act as

an independent influence on the way these policies are carried out is a challenge (Ikenberry, 2014).

Hermann's research demonstrates that nationalism (or in-group bias) as a cognitive belief, and distrust of others are two broad aspects of authoritarianism. When these traits are apparent in heads of state, these individuals usually have strong negative expressions towards other nations and are unwilling to commit resources to foreign relations (Winter, 1992, p. 88). In order to conceptualise nationalism, Florian Bieber's (2018, p. 520) definition is a good starting place:

Nationalism is a malleable and narrow ideology, which values membership in a nation greater than other groups, seeks distinction from other nations, and strives to preserve the nation and give preference to political representation by the nation for the nation.

Building on this definition, I add that a nation is a group of people that conceives itself as constituting a unique community with a distinct identity, and expresses this sentiment through the value placed on national symbols, pledges, shared history, flags and other everyday markers that remind us of our national identity. In Benedict Anderson's (1983) famous phrase, nations are 'imagined communities', where total strangers nonetheless recognise and acknowledge each other as belonging to the same group. The elusive concept of nationalism has shaped human history in ways that many people do not fully appreciate, and in the US, as in other countries, nationalist sentiments inevitably infuse politics.

The central contribution of this article is to provide an understanding of the effect that nationalistic leaders have on international relations. First, I identify a theoretical framework of nationalism applied to the US case specifically; second, I explore Trump's foreign policies and identify examples which could benefit from an FPA perspective; third, I critically evaluate the relevant literature on LTA and OCA in relation to nationalism; finally, I apply my research findings to the theoretical framework in order to connect Trump's nationalistic foreign policies to his individual personality and beliefs. This research is relevant to the field of International Relations for several reasons. As the sole superpower in the current unipolar world, the US dominates international relations not only militarily, but also culturally and economically. Therefore, the foreign policies of the US affect almost every other state in the world. As a country with nuclear capabilities and the largest military, understanding the psychology of a commander-in-chief, who has been described by many as unpredictable, volatile and even rogue is critical. As Peterson correctly observes, 'presidents remain the most potent political force in the making of foreign policy' (1994, p. 217) and Trump is especially unsettling to many in the international community with his volatility and unpredictability.

The belief that leaders matter and can influence foreign policy decision-making is deeply ingrained (Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Kaarbo, 2018). It is fair to say, however, that most contemporary theoretical work on International Relations did not follow this line of thinking, and instead overlooked the personality, beliefs and perceptions of the decision-making unit. It was assumed that this unit, whether working as one or in a group, was a unitary, rational actor and was therefore seen as equivalent to the state. This assumption was not theoretically challenged until Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's (1962) pioneering argument, namely that the individual decision-making process is at the heart of international relations. Snyder and his colleagues argued that in order to understand the behaviour of states, it was necessary to focus on the intellectual processes of the individuals who make key foreign policy decisions. The field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) can offer useful insights into state behaviours that may seem puzzling, as it examines the processes and results of political decision-making. Often, as with this article, scholars may be explaining not simply a single decision or indecision, but a pattern of behaviours made within a certain time frame or set of circumstances. One way that FPA complements the field of IR is its employment of a multilevel analysis of variables, from the micro to the macro (Kaarbo, 2015). FPA scholars examine those factors which influence foreign policy decision-makers and, as a result, the field has developed into an integrated approach which combines insights from various disciplines.

The time is now ripe for taking stock of the theoretical debate on the effects of individual leaders on modern nationalism and for contemplating alternative ways of thinking about nationalism in the current political climate. I find that Donald Trump fits into Margaret Hermann's constructed 'expansionistic' leadership style, which corresponds to low cognitive complexity, high need for power, deep mistrust of others, and pronounced in-group bias. Hermann's (1980) research shows that leaders with this personality are statistically more likely to engage in armed conflict and diversionary actions, such as blaming external scapegoats for the country's problems in order to foster support from the population against perceived threats (Foster and Keller, 2012).

The organisation of this article is as follows. The next chapter will explore the rise of nationalism in American foreign policy. It will establish a comprehensive discourse on the relevant theory of nationalism, which has resulted in a gap in the literature linking nationalism and leaders in American foreign policy. It will then outline four puzzling foreign policies adopted by Donald Trump, for which structural theories cannot fully account and which form the basis for investigation. The third chapter will provide a theoretical framework on political leaders and foreign policy. It will first overview the value that political psychology adds to FPA, and will then explore the vibrant developments in the literature concerning the agency of decision-makers. Following that, it will explain the framework of LTA and OCA in depth by explaining the characteristics and coding procedures for traits and beliefs. Consequently, it will bridge the gap among personality, beliefs and nationalism. Finally, it will link personality traits and beliefs to political behaviour in the US. Chapter 4 will explain

the research design and methodology used for this article. Chapter 5 will present my research findings and outline the leadership style and operational codes of Donald Trump compared to a norming group of past US presidents, world leaders and rogue leaders. Chapter 6 will provide a discussion on the relationship between Trump's leadership style and belief system, and his nationalistic policies at home and abroad, and will then offer directions for future research as well as explain the limitations of this project. The final chapter will summarise the overall research objectives and reiterate my conclusions.

The rise of nationalism

The exploitation of nationalist sentiments by highly nationalistic leaders during the twentieth century culminated in events such as the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide, in which almost entire ethnic groups were slaughtered to create a homogeneous nation. In the wake of these human rights atrocities, the international community worked to foster international cooperation and globalisation, which caused many scholars to predict the end of nationalism (Fukuyama, 1989). Until recently, that period of xenophobic nationalist sentiment appeared to be of the past. Modern insecurities, however, such as immigration, security, terrorism and unemployment have caused those nationalistic ideas to return into political discourse (Bieber, 2018). The purpose of this literature review is to explore the link between the unique nature of American nationalism as it interacts with President Trump's personality, manifested in his attempts to exploit nationalistic sentiment via foreign policy. Thus, some of his foreign policy decisions may seem puzzling unless one includes a personality-based research approach.

This literature review of nationalism will establish a characterisation of American nationalism. First, it will explore the intertwined concepts of American exceptionalism and national identity. American nationalism requires its own theoretical framework, as it does not fit into mainstream theories about nationalism. Second, it will investigate the effects of Trump's 'America First' policies on the US economy and international prestige. Finally, it will identify four puzzling foreign policy decisions that this article seeks to explain by profiling Trump's personality and beliefs. The following chapters will investigate this by combining a theoretical framework with qualitative examples of American nationalism at a collective and national level in order to identify its effects at the individual level.

American nationalism is often described as unique compared to that of most nations. Indeed, it is referred to as 'American exceptionalism' to highlight its inherent sense of superiority over other nations, which carries with it a unique moral value and responsibility (Byers, 1997, p. 86). Critics of American nationalism tend to focus on what has been called "American imperialism", especially after the 2003 Iraq War. For much of America's history prior to WWII, however, American culture has embodied a strong sense of isolationism. This isolationism was not simply a desire to withdraw from the world, but rather a complex form of chauvinism and American messianism rooted in the belief that America was a unique and superior 'city on a hill' (Lieven, 2004, p. 3). This belief culminates in nationalist unilateralism

in international affairs and a contempt for foreigners. Such American national identity and notions of exceptionalism are deeply intertwined with the American creed, which was summed up by Richard Hofstadter: ‘It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one’ (cited in Kohn, 1957, p. 13). As a nation of immigrants, American nationalism is civic in nature and based on faith in its democratic ideals, liberty, constitutionalism, individualism and freedom (Lieven, 2004). In de Tocqueville’s words, ‘the Americans are unanimous upon the general principles which ought to rule human society’ (cited in Lieven, 2004, p. 48); this remains just as true today as it did when it was first observed in the 1830s.

I seek to reflect on trends of rising nationalist sentiment in the United States, which culminated in the 2016 election of a billionaire businessman who had little knowledge of international relations and no prior political experience. The election itself consisted of critiques of internationalism, globalisation and free trade in favour of pugnacious nationalism (Brands, 2017, p. 73). Relatedly, his campaign slogan ‘Make America Great Again’ aimed to evoke memories of an imagined golden age of American primacy before internationalism, to which he promised to return. In an interview shortly after the election, American nationalism expert Anatol Lieven (2017) described Trump as representing a highly exclusionary and chauvinistic nationalism, characterised by his belief that Americans are the only ones deserving of the American way of life, and that non-Americans, who cannot share these values, will threaten them.

Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ policies

In the years since his election, the Trump administration has blithely attempted to implement his ‘America First’ agenda, characterised as an impolitic foreign policy plan that distrusted US allies, actively encouraged the break-up of the European Union, and called security alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obsolete (Dombrowski and Reich, 2017, p. 1013). He called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) ‘a rape of our country’ at a campaign rally in 2016 and promptly withdrew the US from the agreement within his first days in office. Trump’s undue emphasis on ‘America First’ is highly evident in his decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, which is seen as the backbone of global climate governance, in favour of protecting manufacturing jobs and the short-term economic benefits of unregulated carbon emissions (Zhang, Dai, Lai and Wang, 2017). The announcement came as a shock to the international community since the US had played a leading role in the international climate negotiations and governance until now (Dai, Xie and Zhang, 2018, p. 363). The administration’s advocacy of an economic nationalism abroad and cultural nation-building at home has caused scholars such as John Ikenberry (2018) to predict the reversal of globalisation and the subsequent decline of the liberal international order that the US had sustained for nearly eight decades.

Studying nationalism in America requires a nuanced and integrated approach. It does not readily fit into most theoretical frameworks for a few reasons. First, America’s relatively

young age as a nation compared to others in Europe coupled with the lack of oppression since its independence means that it cannot be explained by the mainstream modernisation theory of nationalism. Second, its diverse immigrant population has resulted in its strong sense of civic nationalism over the more commonly seen ethnic nationalism elsewhere. Third, despite being highly nationalistic, Americans genuinely do not consider themselves as such (Lieven, 2004, p. 6). Since America does not seem to fit into the dominant theoretical frameworks of nationalism studies, scholars have tended to avoid connecting American nationalism to foreign policy (Bonikowski and DiMaggio, 2016). This gap in the literature is puzzling for three reasons. First, the US case is significant due to the country's role as global liberal hegemon, one who champions free-world values and attempts to recreate other states in its own image (Ikenberry, 2018). Second, the US is a distinct example of a multi-ethnic polity, which has survived several centuries due to the prominence of its civic nationalism. Third, Lieven (2004) argues that it is crucial to understand the influence of American nationalism on US foreign policy and, consequently, the effect of those policy outcomes on the world. This area of research is ripe for theoretical development.

For the purpose of this article, I find the *ethno-symbolic approach* to be a useful theory of nationalism. This approach emphasises the role that symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions play on the persistence and power of nationalism at a collective level and also on individuals (Smith, 2001, p. 84). I find this approach useful in explaining how Trump has exploited nationalist sentiment in order to gain support for his foreign policy decisions. This theory differs from others as it emphasises the importance of subjective elements in our understanding of nations, such as the role of memories of golden ages, heroes in the national past, and the significance given to flags and other national symbols. This approach also illuminates the emotive power of collective memory and explains how nationalism can generate such widespread popular support (Smith, 1996). Ethno-symbolic scholars identify three key features of nationalism, which can be applied to explain the US case. The first is *a sense of oneness*, in which members of the nation have a strong sense of loyalty to other members, despite only knowing a fraction of them. Consequently, this feeling of deep affinity with one's own group can make empathy for outsiders more elusive. Second, a *distinct culture* involves the rituals, symbols, language and beliefs which separate one nation from another. Cynthia Koch argues that the significance given to American historical figures such as Christopher Columbus or George Washington amounts to almost biblical worship. Indeed, 'their successes signified heavenly approval for the American national enterprise' (Koch, 1996, pp. 32–33, 45). Furthermore, nationalist discourse regards the American flag as so holy that any criticisms of it amount to blasphemy, and discussion continues on whether the 'misuse of the flag should automatically result in a long stretch in jail' (Bosworth, 2013, p. 27). Interestingly, Donald Trump wrote on Twitter in 2016: 'Nobody should be allowed to burn the American flag - if they do, there must be consequences - perhaps loss of citizenship or year in jail!', despite the Supreme Court holding since 1989 that flag-burning was a constitutionally protected right to free speech.² Third, a *sense of superiority* is especially apparent in the US,

dating back to the idea of Manifest Destiny, and is shrouded in American national identity. Madeleine Albright captured this feeling in 1998 when she famously said: ‘If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future’ (quoted in Mearsheimer, 2018).³

One prominent feature of nationalism is the desire to return to the glorified past of an ethnically purer nation and traditional society, where hard-working people are guaranteed a decent job (Lieven, 2004, p. 90). Although the US is ethnically heterogeneous, the ethno-symbolic approach does provide an explanation for the deepening divide between the “ethnic core” that is the White Anglo-Protestants, and the minority ethnic groups within the country. The US has experienced such rapid demographic changes from immigration that researchers predict White people will make up the minority by 2045 (Pew Research Center, 2015). Trump claims to provide a panacea to the social helplessness affecting his followers, who feel displaced by those who were historically considered “beneath” them – minorities, immigrants etc. Bohleber (2010) describes how Hitler used such fears to manipulate German prejudice against Jewish citizens. White nationalists, whose loyalty Trump has openly courted, articulate this sentiment quite clearly (Rudden and Brandt, 2018, p. 48).

Hatred and fear that is directed abroad by nationalism usually emanates from tensions and resentment at home, which is distinctly true for the United States. John Mearsheimer identifies two ways a political leader can foster nationalist sentiments: by creating a foreign bogeyman sufficiently feared to motivate the nation to defend against it, and by unifying the majority against a treacherous ‘other’ within society itself (2018, p. 38). Popular concerns over the loss of manufacturing jobs, immigration, terrorism and America’s standing in the world have been attributed to malevolent outsiders in political discourse. This contempt of the ‘other’ suffuses the nation and creates powerful motivations to eliminate the threat by any means, including violence (Mearsheimer, 2018).

To be clear, nationalism does have its virtues. Stephen Walt (2019) argues that it is not a bad thing for individuals to make sacrifices willingly for the common good. Having a healthy feeling of pride and unity within a nation is preferable to discord. The significance attached to national flags, anthems, national heroes and shared history creates the sense of a distinct culture which separates one nation from another. Also, studies using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) have tracked levels of nationalism across a range of countries. They have found that countries which scored highest in nationalist sentiments, measured as having a high degree of national superiority, and were also consistently wealthier with lower rates of crime and corruption (de las Casas, 2009). The extreme cases which are usually cited alongside nationalism, such as Nazi Germany, Rwanda and Yugoslavia to name but a few, can be argued to represent the exception rather than the rule. Walt (2019), however, stresses that passionate national sentiment can be exploited by political leaders to garner public support for what would otherwise be unpopular policies.

Scholars and analysts continue to debate whether US foreign policy has really changed much under Trump. Indeed, some refer to his security policies as ‘pragmatic realism’ and argue that, despite his rhetoric, his actual policies resemble more continuity than change (Dombrowski and Reich, 2017). While US foreign policy has undoubtedly been tinged with nationalist sentiment since the country’s birth, the past four presidents, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama all dealt with global concerns such as climate change, nuclear proliferation and human rights through international cooperation and alliances when able. The Paris Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal were achieved through cooperation with the international community in order to make the world a safer place for everybody, not just Americans. These presidents tried to protect and advance what they perceived to be national interests abroad without abandoning American values in the process. While this assessment is by no means exhaustive, it stands in stark contrast to the strategies employed by Donald Trump. The xenophobic feelings aroused by Trump’s rhetoric have condemned children to cages at the southern border, separated from their parents. Intense feelings of American superiority have caused the break-up of significant trade agreements, which hurt the economy in the long run. Never before had an American president labelled Mexican immigrants as ‘criminals’ and ‘rapists’ who come to steal American jobs, or inspired their followers to chant ‘send her back’ at four non-white US Congresswomen at a political rally.

Trump had promised in his campaign that he would put America first, but many of his decisions so far have damaged the US economy and prestige abroad. There are four puzzling foreign policy decisions for which this article will try to account: first, the decision to move Israel’s US embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv in May 2018. The decision broke with an international consensus that called for the status of Jerusalem to be settled in peace talks with the Palestinians (Powaski, 2019). The UN General Assembly rebuked the decision in a vote of 128 to 9, with 35 abstentions (Abuzayyad, 2018). The decision also hampers every national security objective the administration has in the region, if the embassy is moved before Jerusalem’s status is resolved. What is puzzling is that there are few discernible gains from this move, as Trump received nothing in the way of concessions from Israel.

The second decision involved the withdrawal from the TPP in January 2017. Trump’s opposition to the TPP rests on his assertion that it would have pushed manufacturing jobs overseas despite evidence indicating otherwise (McBride and Chatzky, 2019). The TPP would have expanded trade relations and added protections for American workers. In 2018, the rest of the signatories created their own trade agreement, which did not include the US (Samuelson, 2018). This is of consequence for several reasons. It makes other countries less dependent on the US and more susceptible to Chinese or Russian economic influence. Furthermore, the withdrawal is contrary to US economic interests. The Peterson Institute for International Economics conducted a comprehensive analysis of the TPP and found that it could have increased US real income by about \$130 billion, boosted the number of high-paying jobs in export industries, and lowered costs for US consumers and manufacturers (Schott, 2016).

The third questionable policy decision is the announcement of the travel ban from Muslim-majority countries. In January 2017, Trump signed an executive order halting all refugee admissions and temporarily banning people from Muslim-majority Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Yemen (Wadhia, 2018, p. 1484) from entry. His stated aim was to prevent terrorist attacks, which fits into his pattern of equating Muslims with terrorists. What is puzzling, however, is that Saudi Arabia was left off his list despite being the country of origin of the majority of the 9/11 hijackers.

Finally, Trump's close relationships with rogue leaders such as Putin and Kim Jong Un are also puzzling, as is his tendency to ruin relationships with other heads of state. This set of behaviours cannot be explained by realism, liberalism or constructivism. Realism cannot account for why an American president would strengthen ties with countries that pose a significant threat to the US. Liberalism would not be able to explain why a democratic leader would be personally close to the heads of repressive regimes who violate human rights. Further, constructivism fails to provide a reason why a US president, who supposedly espouses the core values of American democracy, would befriend leaders who abide by such different norms, values and institutions. The above are just a few of his nationalistic foreign policies which cannot be definitively explained without unpacking the black box and examining the individual leader.

Over the course of the twentieth century, the nations of the world created institutions, doctrines and free trade agreements designed to increase interdependence and economic development. Today, however, we face a new kind of conflict that has emerged as a result of increasing globalisation: hyper-nationalism. It is in times such as now that global leadership becomes more significant than ever. As political philosopher Isaiah Berlin once said: 'At crucial moments, at turning points [...] individuals and their decisions and acts can determine the course of history' (quoted in Safty, 2002, p. 157).

Leaders and foreign policy

This article is based on the assumption that leaders matter from a foreign policy perspective. As noted earlier, this assumption was often rebuked by supporters of the rationalist framework paradigm, which stated that political leaders would advance national interests by carefully weighing the costs and benefits. This rational actor framework did not assign a role to individual personalities, flawed information processing, emotions or other psychological variables (Levy, 2003, p. 256). This discord between understanding the psychology of the decision-making process versus assuming rationality during decision-making has been the focus of long-standing ontological and epistemological debates. Scholars, however, have emphasised that 'leaders define constraints, make decisions, and manage domestic political pressures on their foreign policy choices' (cited in Hermann and Hagan, 1998), which has created the assumption that leaders can have a causal impact on foreign policy (Levy, 2003).

The last twenty-five years have witnessed an impressive expansion of research on psychological constructs, both theoretically and methodologically. Political psychology studies have challenged the rational actor assumption by integrating factors such as past experiences, beliefs, perceptions, goals, risk propensity and cognitive complexity into the broader field of FPA. For example, research on political decision-making suggests that variation in a leader's beliefs and personality traits produces systematic differences in the way that they perceive and respond to opportunities and risks (Foster and Keller, 2012, p. 586). Further, work on leadership psychology shows that traits which are associated with higher risk-taking, such as conceptual simplicity and aggressive responses to constraints are crucial intervening variables that increase the likelihood of the use of force (Foster and Keller, 2014). Scholars of political psychology contend that although international and domestic structures may constrain foreign policy options, when they leave room for choice it is the decision-maker's personality, beliefs and cognitive processes which guide their choice (Jervis, 1976; George, 1969; Hermann, 1980).

For most US presidents, bureaucratic politics, organisational processes and group dynamics help shape decision-making due to the nature of the “checks and balances” of the political system. These constrain the manner in which issues are defined and the range of options considered by channelling information and utilising expertise. Scholars have emphasised the influence of group dynamics in situations ranging from the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison, 1971) to the troop surge Barack Obama ordered into Afghanistan (Marsh, 2014). This article, however, predicts that Trump's personality and beliefs diverge greatly from those of his predecessors, so much so that they override these constraints because he views anyone who disagrees with him as disloyal and would sooner replace them than make a political compromise. This scrutiny is corroborated by the unprecedented turnover rate of his closest advisors. James Goldgeier and Elizabeth Saunders (2018, p. 155) argue that decision-making had become centralised in the White House, as evidenced by the fact that Trump had received very little pushback from Congress over his foreign policy choices.

As the international system grows more interdependent and complex, political leaders face several dilemmas when making policy choices. The first is that the international environment is inherently demanding on the information-processing system of policy-makers; leaders must sometimes deal with incomplete or unreliable information on the intentions or capabilities of others, and then must choose among options with incommensurable values, sometimes under great time pressure (Tetlock and McGuire, 2014, p. 490). The second is that human beings are limited-capacity information processors, who use simplifying strategies in the face of complex situations (Jervis, 1976). Due to these inherent difficulties for every political leader, it is useful to explore the psychological framework that affects the manner in which they deal with these complexities.

As noted, the ways to study the psychology of decision-makers are numerous. The two

psychological approaches I believe are most useful in studying President Trump and his nationalistic foreign policies are his personality and belief system, specifically the influence that certain personality traits and beliefs have on setting a nationalistic policy agenda. The relationship between personality and beliefs is deeply intertwined. Certain personality traits tend to be associated with particular beliefs, such as LTA's *belief in the ability to control events* and OCA's *control over historical events*. I predict that the direction of his master beliefs will correspond accordingly to LTA traits and strengthen the causal link to political behaviour. Personality traits influencing openness to information may constrain incoming intelligence that conflicts with existing beliefs. Most individuals are inclined to avoid the dissonance that arises when they are faced with conflicting information (Rapport, 2018). Some people, however, seem able to tolerate inconsistency in their statements and espouse beliefs without suffering from that cognitive dissonance (Post, 2005). I believe this might be applicable to Donald Trump in regard to his friendship with Vladimir Putin. I chose to combine LTA and OCA because, together, they can provide a more holistic insight into the decision-making process. One benefit of incorporating both into this study is that the range of material examined is increased: LTA uses spontaneous material while OCA relies on speeches. Although scholars debate which one is more useful for analysis, I argue that they can complement each other and provide insights into a wider range of issues. Another advantage is the computer-based software *ProfilerPlus*, which can analyse both scores simultaneously and produce immediate comparative results. This increases reliability, replicability and direct comparisons of psychological variables (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998). These two psychological approaches, when combined, have been found to account for a relatively large percentage of the variance in explaining foreign policy behaviour, especially when a leader is the head of government, there is a crisis, no clear precedents, when events threaten deeply held values, or when the policy situation is ambiguous (Greenstein, 1969; Hermann, 1984; Byman and Pollack, 2001). Thus, most personality and political psychology studies on US leaders tend to focus on presidential decisions during or resulting in war. This article, however, seeks to study how Donald Trump's personality and beliefs affected his everyday foreign policy decision-making, which resulted in his nationalistic rhetoric and 'America first' foreign policies. The next chapters of this article will overview the two dominant approaches to studying personality and beliefs: Leadership Trait Analysis and Operational Code Analysis. I will first overview Margaret Hermann's seven personality traits and how they are coded, before reviewing the relevant literature on the topic. Then, I will introduce the ten questions which constitute an individual's operational code and survey the vibrant literature on belief systems.

Leadership Trait Analysis

Personality is defined as a 'collection of relatively persistent individual differences that transcend specific situations and contribute to the observed stability of attitudes and behaviour' (Huddy, Sears and Levy, 2013). In a political personality profile, we attempt to identify the linkage between beliefs, values, attitudes and deeply ingrained patterns that have

strong predictive implications on foreign policy (Post, 2003). In other words, the essence of the leader's personality defines their range of beliefs, opinions, motivations and information processing. It determines the nature of the relationships with those in the group, including who is chosen to serve in it. Personality traits affect a leader's goals and motivations. They also affect how they respond to cues, symbols and stimuli, and how they interpret information. Also, a leader's personality affects their determination, risk-orientation, perception, and management of emotions, all of which are highly influential to decision-making (Hermann, 2003).

This chapter builds on the work by Margaret Hermann (1980), who identifies specific traits that condition how leaders deal with the complexities of international politics. These seven personality traits – *belief in the ability to control events, need for power, conceptual complexity, distrust of others, in-group bias, self-confidence* and *task orientation* – illustrate whether leaders respect or challenge constraints, are open to incoming information, how they deal with opposition and, ultimately, the policies that they will choose (Hermann, 2003). LTA research assumes that one can conceptualise someone's personality by the words they use, which can be quantitatively measured to form a personality profile. Hermann also suggests that situational variables can mediate or “filter” the effects of personality on foreign policy. For example, a leader who is strongly interested in foreign policy is likely to increase the effects of personality, while sensitivity to the environment combined with training and experience are likely to decrease its effects (2001).

For the purpose of linking Donald Trump's personality traits to his nationalistic foreign policies, I will focus on four of the seven personality traits: *in-group bias, distrust of others, need for power*, and *conceptual complexity*. For an overview of all seven traits, see Appendix A. Taken together, in-group bias and distrust provide information on the leader's motivation towards the world. Thus, in assessing motivation, we are interested in whether the leader is more likely to adopt conflictual or cooperative policies, and also the intensity of their need to preserve the nation they are leading. The need for power will suggest whether they will challenge or respect constraints in their environment. Conceptual complexity and self-confidence explain how open they are to information, which relates to the next chapter on operational codes and beliefs; if one is closed to new information, especially if it contradicts their existing beliefs, they can fall into confirmation bias and poor decision-making. The conceptualisation and coding for each trait, which borrows from Hermann's (2003) discussion on assessing leadership style, are summarised in Table 1.

Table 1

Conceptual complexity	Capability of discerning the different dimensions of a complex environment	Percentage of words related to high complexity ("approximately", "possibility") vs low complexity ("absolutely", "irreversible")
Distrust of others	Suspicious, wariness of others outside one's group	Percentage of nouns that indicate misgivings or suspicions that others intend harm towards the speaker or the speaker's group
In-group bias	Perception of one's group as holding a central role, accompanied with strong feelings of national identity and honour	Percentage of references to the group that are favourable ("successful", "great"), show strength ("powerful") or a need to maintain group identity ("defend our borders")
Need for power	A concern with gaining, keeping and restoring power over others	Percentage of verbs that reflect actions of attack, advice, influence on the behaviour of others, concern with reputation

Source: Dyson (2006), drawing on Hermann (2003)

Once all seven traits are coded, it is time to put them into perspective against other leaders. Determining whether a leader scores high or low on a certain trait requires a comparative analysis against a norming group. The norming groups I will employ for a comparison against Trump's LTA scores are 284 World Leaders and 18 American Leaders. When a trait is a standard deviation above the norming group, the leader scores high on that trait. Conversely, if they are a standard deviation below the norming group, they score low on that trait. If the trait in question is close to the mean of the norming group, they are moderate on that trait. These personality traits are used to develop a leader's personality profile, which can then establish their leadership style.

Leadership style is defined by Hermann (2003, p. 178) as: '[w]ays in which leaders relate to those around them, whether constituents, advisors, or other leaders. It's how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions.' A healthy leadership style has characteristics that contribute to sound decision-making, and the ability to perceive the environment accurately and work effectively within a group chosen for its expertise and wisdom, from which the self-confident leader can learn and take wise counsel (Post, 2005). A completely rational and effective leadership style would allow the decision-maker to engage in a thoughtful, deliberative process that seeks a diverse range of information, considers alternatives and asks the hard questions. He or she would check against biases, question assumptions and reconsider choices when needed (Schafer and Crichlow, 2010).

Hermann has developed an eight-fold typology of leadership styles based on their responsiveness to constraints, openness to information, and motivations. The *expansionist* leader is one who challenges constraints, is closed to information, and is problem-focused rather than relationship-focused. This type of leader is concerned with expanding their own power and influence. The *charismatic* leader is one who challenges constraints but is open to information and is relationship-focused. The *actively independent* leader is focused on maintaining one's own and the government's manoeuvrability and independence in a world that is perceived as continually trying to limit both. Such leaders pursue their goals by engaging other people and persuading them to act. The reactive or *opportunistic* leader respects constraints, is open to information, and tends to focus on what is realistically possible in a given situation.⁴

A review of LTA literature

In the past twenty years, scholars have built on Hermann's pioneering work and developed an impressive body of empirical research demonstrating the validity and utility of LTA for the study of political leaders. This scholarship includes: comparative studies of US presidents (Preston, 2001; Preston and Hermann, 2004; Hermann, 2005), British prime ministers (Hermann and Kaarbo, 1998; Kaarbo, 2018; Dyson, 2006; Dyson, 2009), Iranian revolutionary leaders (Taysi and Preston, 2001), Soviet Politburo members (Hermann, 1980; Winter,

Hermann, Weintraub and Walker, 1991), heads of the United Nations (Kille, 2006), and sub-Saharan African leaders (Hermann, 1987). The theoretical and methodological rigour of the LTA framework has given FPA scholars the opportunity to fill in gaps in puzzling political behaviour, such as why some leaders are more risk-acceptant vs risk-averse, or why some are more willing to bargain or negotiate. Based on the leadership characteristics contained in the LTA framework (specifically the need for power, in-group bias, distrust of others and task focus), Jonathon Keller (2005) suggests that leaders can be broadly categorised into two groups: those who respect constraints and those who challenge them. Keller analysed 39 democratic leaders and 147 foreign policy outcomes and found that the leaders classified as constraint challengers were more likely to use violence than those classified as constraint respecters. Relatedly, studies show that leaders who are constraint challengers have lower levels of cognitive complexity, higher levels of distrust, are more nationalistic and are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies (Kowert and Hermann, 1997; Keller, 2005; Foster and Keller, 2012; Foster and Keller, 2014).

I chose LTA because it is a multivariate method of constructing personality profiles of political leaders using different motivational and cognitive variables. It is particularly useful for explaining a leader's foreign policy orientation by offering a more holistic approach, which incorporates beliefs, traits, motivations and leadership style, rather than a single variable approach. It has reliably demonstrated that certain personality traits correspond to foreign policy outcomes and provides a systematic method of approach. Hermann's model, which combines the effects of seven objectively defined personality traits with filters of interest, situation and learning is a sophisticated and advanced method of personality theory and methodology. Furthermore, enough research has been conducted using this method for it to provide reliable regional and world norming groups to which an individual can be compared.

Operational codes

Those who study foreign policy decision-making have long recognised that the individual beliefs of leaders are critical to understanding foreign policy decisions. Belief systems give decision-makers much needed cognitive order and stability in an ambiguous and complex international environment (George, 1969). A decision-maker's belief system is important in the realm of IR because beliefs are what provide norms, standards and guidelines which influence (albeit not determine unilaterally) their strategic choices in dealing with other nations (Tetlock and McGuire, 2014). Beliefs impact their perceptions of how the world works, as well as how to respond appropriately when making decisions.

A growing research area in FPA centres on those beliefs of leaders that make up their operational codes (Leites, 1951; George, 1969). The operational code approach provides policy-relevant knowledge about how the individual views the political universe and their place within it (Dyson and Parent, 2018). George proposed that the essence of the operational code can be captured in its answers to a number of questions concerning the nature of

the political universe and the types of policies most likely to achieve important objectives (Holsti, 1976). Subsequent research by George (1969) and Walker (1990) has refined this concept into two classes of beliefs: philosophical and instrumental. Stressing policy-makers' cognitive limitations, George (1969) hypothesised that leaders regularly draw from a set of five instrumental and five philosophical beliefs in order to deal with the complexities of the decision-making process. Philosophical beliefs establish a decision-maker's views on the fundamental nature of politics, such as whether it is primarily characterised by conflict or cooperation. Fundamentally, this relates to the degree to which the political universe is friendly or hostile, and the degree of control the actor perceives themselves as having over it. Instrumental beliefs specify ends–means relationships, or the 'norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor's choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action' (George, 1969 p.108).

The core argument of this approach is that leaders filter incoming information through their beliefs in order to maintain consistency (Jervis, 2006). For political decision-making, leaders respond not to an objective reality but rather a 'subjective representation of reality', which is filtered through their belief system (Holsti, 1962; Renshon, 2008). OCA scholars argue that belief systems matter in the explanation of foreign policy in ways which are not addressed very well by other structural theories (Tetlock, 1998). Cognitive theories, especially OCA, allow for the possibility that beliefs play an exogenous role, which steers decision-makers by shaping their motivations, perceptions and biases rather than passively reflecting reality (Schafer and Walker, 2006, p. 5). The effect of beliefs on foreign policy-making is especially salient when the environment is uncertain (Holsti, 1976), when new information does not align with an individual's pre-existing beliefs, or when they are aroused by strong emotions such as hate, unease and rage (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). The effects of beliefs on decision-making can take the form of mirroring, steering and learning processes (Malici, 2017). Beliefs can mirror information from the external context that influences decision-makers to maintain or change strategies of conflict management, initiate trade wars or impose economic sanctions, adopt or obstruct institutional reforms, and support or oppose international agreements (Drury, 2000). Beliefs can exercise steering when pre-existing notions compete with new information, which sometimes results in motivated bias. Other times, beliefs can change as part of the learning process. These examples illustrate the potential importance of understanding a leader's operational codes. The effectiveness and reliability of OCA has increased since the creation of the automated coding Verbs in Context System (VICS) (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998), and has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject. The next chapter will explain these beliefs and how they are coded.

Philosophical and instrumental beliefs

George (1969, 1979) and Holsti (1970, 1976) developed ten questions to identify the modus operandi of a political leader. Their conceptualisation of belief systems generated the assumption that operational code beliefs were internally coherent, generally remained

stable over time, and extended across different levels for a particular leader. Like LTA, OCA can be measured at-a-distance using a leader's speech acts to quantify their belief system. Contemporary OCA uses the Verbs in Context Systems (VICS) developed by Walker, Schafer and Young (1998) to measure the answers to George's ten operational code questions:

Philosophical beliefs:

1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or of conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for realising one's fundamental political values? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects are they one and/or the other?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. How much control can one have over historical developments? What is one's role in moving or shaping history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of chance in human affairs and historical development?

Instrumental beliefs:

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals for political action?
2. How are such goals and objectives pursued most effectively?
3. What is the best approach to the calculation, control and acceptance of the risks of political action?
4. What is the best "timing" of action?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

Table 2 below illustrates the process of scoring for the beliefs used in this article. Creating a typology of the operational code scores allows researchers to form predictions about the leader's likely strategic choices.

Table 2

P-1 Nature of the political universe

HOSTILE						FRIENDLY		
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
-1.0	-.75	-.50	-.025	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

I-1 Direction of strategy

CONFLICT						COOPERATION		
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
-1.0	-.75	-.50	-.025	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

I-5 Utility of means

UTILITY				UTILITY	
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High	
0.0	.08	.16	.24	.32	

The verbal descriptor data is borrowed from Walker et al. (2003)

The purpose of VICS is to look for manifestations of beliefs about power relationships between the self and others. The VICS method focuses primarily on verbs in public and private statements, such as interviews, speeches, press conferences and letters, which indicate different intensities of power found in deeds and words, and codes them on a conflict-cooperation continuum. *Deeds* indicate the exercise of power in the form of positive and negative actions (i.e. “invade”, “attack” or “aid”) and *words* indicate the invocation of authority to support or oppose actions in lower forms of intensity (i.e. “threaten” or “praise”). Coding the intensity of transitive verbs gives us a broad picture of how the actor sees the exercise of power; some may see it as hostile while others may see it as friendly. These beliefs become clear when the actor uses conflict-oriented (coded as negative “-”) or cooperation-oriented (coded as positive “+”) verbs in their rhetoric. Deeds are coded as the most intense sanctions (punishments and rewards) and words of lower intensity are at the opposite end of the spectrum. This spectrum holds six values ranging from -3 to +3, which are marked by the following verb signifiers: punish (-3), threaten (-2), oppose (-1), neutral (0), support (+1), promise (+2), reward (+3). In order to conceptualise how an actor sees others exercise power, we collect and measure the verbs used to talk about other actors, which indicate their philosophical beliefs. In order to uncover how an actor thinks one ought to exercise power, we measure the verbs used to talk about themselves or their in-group to indicate instrumental beliefs. Taken together, the above form a leader’s operational code of the political universe.

In VICS, the first instrumental (I-1) and philosophical (P-1) beliefs are conceptualised as ‘master beliefs’, meaning that, theoretically, all other beliefs should flow from and be empirically linked to them (Walker and Schafer, 2006, p. 33). These master belief scores (I-1 direction of strategy and P-1 nature of the political universe) vary between -1 and $+1$, with lower scores correlating to a more hostile/conflictual view of the political universe and a proclivity for conflict actions. Higher scores point to a more cooperative and friendly view of the universe and inclination towards cooperation.

OCA literature review

Operational codes were introduced in 1951 when Nathan Leites attempted to assist the US government in explaining Soviet thinking and specifically Bolshevik beliefs. They referred to the set of axioms, postulates and premises that constitutes the foundation of broader beliefs and practices (Winter, 2003, p. 26).⁵

The development of VICS has shaped contemporary literature by decreasing the time and errors in coding the belief systems of world leaders. Research on the operational codes of American presidents includes: Jimmy Carter (Rosati, 1987), Lyndon Johnson (Walker and Schafer, 2000), Ronald Reagan (Malici, 2006), Bill Clinton (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998), Woodrow Wilson (Walker and Schafer, 2007), John F. Kennedy (Marfleet, 2000; Renshon 2008), George H.W. Bush (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998) and George W. Bush (Renshon, 2008; Robison, 2006). Studying the effects of presidential beliefs on US foreign policy, Cooper Drury (2000) finds that those which are more conflictual are highly predictive of sanction imposition. Research also shows that a president’s risk orientation and belief in the role of chance affect their decision to initiate trade disputes (Stevenson, 1999). In addition, Malici’s (2004) study of Cold War dynamics found that President Reagan went through experiential learning with Gorbachev, which led to a change in beliefs and strategy towards the USSR. This initiated a shift from confrontation to cooperation and eventually ended the Cold War.

Elizabeth Saunders (2009) compares how two US presidents, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, approached Vietnam to show how leaders confronting the same conflict may arrive at different diagnoses of threat and, thus, choose different strategies. Her case study illustrates how differences in beliefs about the nature of the political universe influence whether or not a leader is inclined to use force. Belief systems also play a role regarding how democratic heads of state view non-democratic regimes and determine whether they are a threat or not (Schafer and Walker, 2006). Strong beliefs of the “other” can sometimes result in misperception, bias, selective attention and even inherent bad faith during the decision-making process. This is highly relevant to explaining nationalist foreign policy. A leader who genuinely believes that a group constituting the “other” is a threat, even if no actual threat exists, will be more willing to act aggressively to protect against this perceived threat. Although beliefs are generally thought to be relatively stable, they can change when leaders are exposed to experiential

learning (Rapport, 2018; Schafer and Gassler, 2000) or shocks (Robison, 2006; Walker and Schafer, 2000). For example, Schafer and Gassler (2000) found that Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat underwent experiential learning, which caused his core beliefs to change. It is likely that his instrumental belief (I-1) switched from conflictual to cooperative, which contributed to his famous decision to go to Jerusalem and engage in peace talks with Israel. Beliefs can also change in the face of crisis events or high levels of enduring stress (Marfleet, 2000; Schafer and Crichlow, 2010), which is what Sam Robison (2006) argues happened to George W. Bush after 9/11. He found that Bush's core beliefs drastically changed from cooperative to conflict-oriented and hostile towards the world following the terrorist attacks.

OCA has developed into a vibrant field of research contributing to FPA. Scholars have examined a wide range of topics including how leaders' beliefs change over time, the effect of specific events on leaders' beliefs, the beliefs of terrorist organisations and rogue leaders, and how beliefs can affect the international economy. The next chapter will discuss the link between OCA and nationalistic foreign policy behaviour.

Linking psychological variables to political behaviour

Introducing psychological variables, such as personality traits and beliefs, into an analysis of political behaviour raises a theoretical question on the causal linkage between beliefs and behaviour. I concur with Walker, Schafer and Young's (1998) positive assessment that political behaviour is not merely a response to constraints and external stimuli, but that beliefs interact with external conditions to provide an explanation for foreign policy behaviour. Numerous studies have identified this causal linkage by including event datasets on state behaviour into their analyses, which show that individual-level psychological variables can affect foreign policy in several ways. They can influence the process of decision-making, as well as the direction (conflict vs cooperation) of foreign policy outcomes (Schafer and Crichlow, 2010). Traits that are most likely to increase a leader's propensity for conflict include a high need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias and negative worldviews for self or others. Conflict-prone individuals will also have low self-confidence and conceptual complexity. Likewise, the inverse of these traits will correlate with more cooperative behaviour. There are certain personality traits which correspond with a higher proclivity for nationalist feelings. Leaders who score high on in-group bias and distrust of others will be more likely to internalise threats, perceive imagined threats where none exist, and act forcefully to defend their in-group against perceived threats.

Leaders who score high on these traits also tend to keep only the most loyal and like-minded people in their decision-making groups and dismiss those who voice dissent, leading to biased decision-making and early consensus. Small-group dynamics is another way individual-level psychological variables influence foreign policy. Although the focus here is on the president as the decision-maker, it is important to emphasise that foreign policies do not occur in a vacuum. They are usually the product of organisational processes and scrutiny from experts,

advisors and committees. For instance, Irving Janis's (1982) work on groupthink argued that the dominant leader, in this case the president, could stifle discussions, discredit information and encourage premature consensus. Whether or not this is likely is directly correlated to the leader's need for power, control orientation and conceptual complexity. It is also the dominant leader who decides who is chosen to serve the group and for how long.

When a leader has high scores in nationalistic personality traits, it can cause over-confidence in the nation's capabilities, decrease cooperation, and increase the likelihood of adopting an aggressively nationalistic foreign policy agenda. Since nationalism includes a belief in the superiority of one's nation, a leader who scores high on self-confidence and in-group bias is more likely to overestimate its military capabilities. George W. Bush believed that the US could easily invade and occupy Iraq; yet, this overconfidence resulted in years of occupation, and loss of life and American credibility in the international community (Walt, 2019). Studies show that a leader who scores high on need for power is less likely to engage in international multilateral or interdependent behaviours (Kaarbo, 2018). Combined with a high score on in-group bias, this could exacerbate isolationist sentiments and cause leaders to act negatively or aggressively towards other actors.

While there have been no empirical studies linking operational codes to nationalist foreign policies, in theory one can argue that the more someone's sense of self is tied to their nation, the more sensitive they will be to the threats and opportunities posed by outside forces. As a result, certain beliefs could cause a leader, who also scores high on nationalistic personality traits, to adopt a nationalist agenda. For instance, if a leader's P-1 belief regarding the nature of the political universe is negative, it is likely that a higher LTA score in distrust for others and in-group bias will also be observed. The same is true for a leader's I-1 belief regarding direction of strategy. One who is more willing to use force and prefers conflictual relations over cooperative ones is likely to be highly nationalistic because their distrust of others causes them to be wary of outsiders. When this wariness escalates into hostility and enemy-imaging it is common to dehumanise people from that "other" country in order to make it easier to adopt strategies which may cause them harm. While a healthy level of patriotic feeling is normal for any leader, when one's core beliefs become overly nationalistic this can prevent political compromise or cooperation and can make cross-border empathy elusive.

This link between the president's personality and beliefs, and their foreign policy has been historically evident since the birth of America. Periods of successful or popular policies are usually characterised by the "doctrine" of that period's president. For example, the Monroe Doctrine sought to protect American hegemony from European powers. The Truman Doctrine, which pledged to fight communism globally, and even the controversial Bush Doctrine, which legitimised pre-emptive attacks in the name of national security, all espouse their named leader's individual beliefs regarding the nature of the political universe and the best strategy to deal with threats. Certainly, there are other factors which contributed to the

implementation of these doctrines, as foreign policy outcomes do not occur in a vacuum; however, I argue that beliefs play an integral role. It is hard to imagine the Spanish-American war occurring if it were not for the expansionist and nationalistic qualities of the Monroe doctrine (Brands, 2006). Would the Vietnam War, which resulted from the Truman doctrine, have lasted so long despite its intense public unpopularity, draft riots and dissident movements if the leaders had not seen the world through such a strong nationalistic “us vs them” mentality (Holsti and Rosenau, 1977)? Would the US still have unilaterally initiated a controversial war in Iraq if George W. Bush’s core beliefs had not changed from cooperative to conflictual in response to 9/11 (Robison, 2006)? Following from Keller’s (2005) framework, I argue that US presidents whose LTA and OCA scores indicate a high need for power, distrust of others and in-group bias will be more likely to engage in nationalistic diversionary foreign policy actions in order to moderate dissatisfaction with domestic policy failures (Foster and Keller, 2014). I hypothesise that this is especially true for Donald Trump because his unabashed nationalistic proclivities should make him more likely to use a scapegoat and blame outsiders for the country’s problems.

Research design and methodology

In this chapter, I will explain the research design and methodological approach used in this article. The research strategy I employ is an individual case study of President Donald Trump using “at-a-distance” quantitative analysis of word count frequency. I chose a single case study in order to explore Trump’s personality and beliefs in relation to foreign policy choices in depth. It is also fair to say that including him into a generalisable study of US presidents is difficult due to his significant departures in rhetoric and disposition compared to his predecessors, even though it is argued by some that his policies fall within conservative Republicanism. What this research seeks to investigate is whether Trump’s policy decisions are driven by rational, conservative decision-making which weighs the costs and benefits, or if there is a hyper-nationalist proclivity that seeks to expand America’s power through aggression at the expense of its interests in the long run. My methodology will include submitting transcribed scripted speeches and spontaneous interviews of Donald Trump, as well as a range of tweets during his tenure in office from his personal Twitter account, through *ProfilerPlus*, an automated content analysis program designed by Social Science Automation (www.socialscienceautomation.com). By integrating his tweets into the analysis, I can avoid one of the pitfalls Margaret Hermann (2003) warns against when examining speeches: that they might be written or practised ahead of time and not a true reflection of their deliverer’s personality. There is a precedent in conducting personality studies using tweets of successful CEOs and entrepreneurs, such as Elon Musk, Oprah Winfrey, Bill Gates and Donald Trump when he was a businessman (Obschonka and Fisch, 2017). There is currently, however, limited academic precedent in profiling a US president’s tweets, since there has never before been a president so strongly associated with Twitter.

As the literature review in Chapter 2 – ‘The rise of nationalism’ – identified, there is a gap in existing research linking US political leaders and nationalism. This research integrates theory and methodology to create a personality profile for Donald Trump in an attempt to explain the four puzzling foreign policy decisions discussed in Chapter 2. Since the American political system gives its executive branch almost unilateral power over foreign policy, I can reasonably expect for his leadership profile to influence foreign policy choices. Below, I will discuss the method of data collection for the independent variables, LTA and OCA. In the next chapters I will explore the link between a US president’s personality profile and the foreign policies adopted during their administration by seeking answers to the following question:

Do Donald Trump’s personality traits and operational codes correspond to increasingly nationalistic foreign policies?

LTA and OCA both rest on the assumption that words are the artefacts of personality and beliefs, meaning that certain traits will be linked to word choices (Hudson, 2007; Hermann, 2003). In order to focus on the relationship between nationalistic foreign policies and Trump’s personality traits and beliefs, I concentrate on certain traits and beliefs. The LTA traits most heavily connected to nationalism are in-group bias and distrust of others. I will also include his need for power and conceptual complexity scores to determine whether he respects or challenges constraints and whether he is open or closed to new information. Taken together, these four traits will explain whether Donald Trump is predisposed to favouring nationalistic foreign policies. The OCA beliefs I will focus on are the two “master beliefs” regarding the nature of the political universe (P-1) and the approach to strategy (I-1), as the other eight indices should flow from these. I also include his utility of means (I-5) because it will provide insight into Trump’s beliefs about the nature of tactics with which to exercise political power. This trait is broken down into six categories: punish, threaten, oppose, support, promise and reward.

Hermann (2003) posits that a reliable assessment of leadership style using LTA can be constructed by analysing at least fifty speech acts of one hundred words or more in length. In order to assess Trump’s overall personality, I collected two foreign policy related tweets per week from his tenure in office (January 2017 – July 2019), as well as ten spontaneous interviews with the press, resulting in 57 speech acts of at least 100 words each and a total of 6,480 words. For OCA, Walker and Schafer (2006) suggest that an accurate profile can be created by analysing at least ten speech acts of at least 1,500 words each, and at least 15–20 verbs per speech act. For Trump’s OCA scores, I analysed ten speeches totalling 16,000 words. This quantitative approach uses Social Science Automation’s *ProfilerPlus* content analysis software to scan for the frequency of certain words. Since this is an automated process, it is 100% reliable, reproducible, and it reduces the risks associated with hand-coding, such as human bias and errors. Extensive dictionaries have been developed for both LTA and OCA,

which automatically code for self-referential pronouns (I, me, we, us etc.); however, Trump frequently uses other non-pronoun references when still talking about himself. For example, ‘The United States strongly opposes...’, which *ProfilerPlus* would have automatically coded as “other”. In an effort to fix this, I followed the advice of Schafer and Walker (2006) and manually went through the speech acts noting relevant instances and changing them into self-referential pronouns before submitting for analysis.

The leadership profile which will be presented in the next chapter was developed in five steps. First, the verbal data corresponding to LTA and OCA was coded separately through *ProfilerPlus*. The results were then put into perspective by comparing them to the norming groups and determining if a trait is low, moderate or high. Then, the LTA leadership style was devised from these quantifications. Based on the leadership style and OCA scores, expectations of political behaviour were described (Hermann, 1999, 2002; Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998, 2003). Finally, I compared the expectations to the four puzzling foreign policies.

Whether taken individually or combined, these seven traits predispose Trump towards his foreign policy choices by providing the psychological framework through which he perceives his environment, his exercise of power, and his strategies for dealing with others. The four LTA traits examined – in-group bias, distrust of others, need for power and conceptual complexity – will be put into perspective by comparing them to a norming group of US presidents and world leaders. Hermann’s LTA has been used extensively to generate a reliable norming group of world leaders. While this provides valuable insight into Trump’s peers around the world, there are considerable cultural and political discrepancies to be taken into account. This is why I chose to include a homogeneous group of past American presidents, which will provide the basis on which Trump’s scores will be assessed as low or high. OCA characteristics P-1, I-1 and I-5 will be compared to norming groups of US presidents and world leaders, but also rogue leaders.⁶ I chose to include a norming group of five rogue leaders (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Bashir al-Assad, Fidel Castro, Kim Jong-Il and Saddam Hussein) for a comparison of OCA scores because Trump has been characterised as “rogue” by his critics, and such a comparison could provide insight into whether this description is at all accurate. Rogue leaders are said to be genuinely belligerent or hostile, and are sometimes described as crazy (Malici, 2017). They are also usually charged with sponsoring terrorism and engaging in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Malici, 2006; Tanter, 1998). Trump’s challenge of core norms, practices and laws of the American political system and international arena are compounded by his close ties to other highly nationalistic rogue leaders.

Results: President Trump's leadership profile

This chapter reveals the results of the case study described previously. The leadership profile of Donald Trump, the 45th president of the United States, is based on an analysis of his speeches, interviews and tweets between 2017–2019 using LTA and OCA. First, I will present my research findings from LTA and OCA in Tables 3 and 4. His full LTA scores are presented in Appendix B. I will then summarise the results and offer outlooks for his behaviour.

Table 3: Leadership Trait Analysis of Donald Trump

Personality Trait	Trump's Mean Score	Comparison	World Leaders	American Leaders
In-group bias	.19	Leans High	Mn=.15 SD=.05	Mn=.13 SD=.03
Distrust	.31	High	Mn=.13 SD=.06	Mn=.12 SD=.03
Power	.32	High	Mn=.26 SD=.05	Mn=.24 SD=.04
Conceptual complexity	.54	Low	Mn=.59 SD=.06	Mn=.60 SD=.05

Donald Trump's scores are distinct for all four personality traits examined here and indicate that he challenges constraints, is closed to information, and is either relationship- or problem-focused depending on the situation.

In-group bias

Trump scored two standard deviations over the American presidents' norming group for in-group bias, which predisposes him towards eliminating threats and problems by engaging in aggressive or assertive behaviour. His scores indicate that he is highly nationalistic, meaning he likely internalises threats, sees the world as "us vs them", and is quick to blame enemies for the country's problems (Hermann, 2005, p. 377). In-group bias was originally termed 'nationalism' in Hermann's early works. It is a view of the world in which one's own group or nation is inherently central compared to others. Generally, there is a strong emotional attachment to the in-group, and importance placed on preserving its culture and superiority. Political leaders who score high on in-group bias wish to maintain their separate identity at all costs. This causes topics such as immigration, border security and globalisation to become hot-button issues, about which the leader is passionate. Leaders also tend to see anyone not belonging to the group as the "other", posing a threat to its status. Instances of increasing the size of the military, closing borders and demonising immigrants are extreme manifestations of high in-group bias. Moreover, the president is likely to see only the good in the US and dismiss any weaknesses. As a result, they would use scapegoats to mobilise

political support against perceived threats. They see the world as a zero-sum game where the US loses if anyone else wins and must, therefore, be vigilant to ensure the US always wins.

Distrust of others

Trump scored six standard deviations over the American presidents' norming group and three over other world leaders. These scores are highly unusual and portray him as much more conflict-oriented than most US presidents. Distrust of others involves a sense of doubt, uneasiness and wariness about others. It develops from seeing the world in black and white, or as a zero-sum game in which someone wins and someone loses. It usually involves an inclination to be suspicious of the motives and actions of others. Leaders who score high on distrust are particularly wary of those who have competing ideologies, and anything they do will be perceived as having ulterior motives to the ones stated. A high score in distrust may often signal willingness to act forcefully, even pre-emptively, to deal with perceived challenges domestically and internationally (Holsti, 1962; Shannon and Keller, 2007). Loyalty becomes compulsory for those working with the leader. Any hint of disloyalty is seen as a challenge to their authority and met with dismissal. Leaders who distrust others tend to be hypersensitive to criticism, even if it is only imagined. In its extreme manifestations or in crisis situations, distrust can turn into paranoia. Leaders who score low on distrust tend to put a situation into a wider perspective, rely on facts, and can accurately diagnose how things stack up.

Need for power and influence

Trump scores two standard deviations higher than the average US president, and one higher than other world leaders. This trait indicates a leader's desire to establish or maintain their power. It also shows their desire to influence or control others by manipulating or violating 'fair play' norms (Preston, 2001; Winter, 1973). The need for power trait is visible when the speaker: (1) engages in strong, forceful actions, such as an attack, threat or accusation; (2) gives unsolicited advice; (3) attempts to control or regulate the behaviour of other groups; (4) tries to persuade, argue with or bribe someone when agreement does not seem otherwise probable; (5) endeavours to gain fame or impress others; and (6) is highly concerned with their reputation or with keeping their position. When the leader has a high need for power, they work to manipulate the environment in an effort to appear a winner. They are highly Machiavellian, trying to ensure that their positions prevail. While they might be outwardly charismatic, they have little real regard for those around them. People are instruments in their game of politics. Leaders who score high on this trait will test the boundaries before committing to a course of action, bargaining for as long as possible in order to see what is feasible and what the consequences of pushing further will be. When the need for power is tempered by self-control, responsibility or altruism, however, it can become an essential, beneficent feature of leadership (Winter, 2003, p. 158). Leaders who score low on the need for power share their influence more easily. They are fine with sharing credit and enjoy empowering others. They are more willing to sacrifice things for the needs of the group and end up boosting morale and team spirit.

Conceptual complexity

Trump scored one standard deviation below the norming groups for this trait, making him low in conceptual complexity. This trait measures the degree of differentiation an individual shows in perceiving other people, places, policies, ideas or things. Less conceptually complex individuals tend to see the world in black and white, and their environment as a zero-sum game. Political leaders who score high on this trait seek a variety of perspectives to appreciate different circumstances. Such leaders often take their time in making decisions, seek others' opinions, and gather as much information as possible. Leaders who score low on conceptual complexity are often willing to go with the first presented option and trust their intuition over new information. Action is preferable to searching for more information, planning or thinking. Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977) compared communications and statements from two US crises that ended in war (WWI and the Korean War) and three that were peacefully resolved (the 1911 Morocco crisis, the 1948 Berlin airlift crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis). They found that the statements indicated higher levels of complexity in the situations where war was avoided. Studies have also been conducted in which conceptual complexity was the only psychological trait measured, which found that 'when high- and low-complexity leaders face negative feedback on an existing foreign policy, the former are much more likely to change course than their low complexity counterparts' (Yang, 2010). Regarding openness to information, Trump's self-confidence scores are lower than his conceptual complexity, which would normally mean he was open to information. Trump's self-confidence and cognitive complexity scores, however, are also both lower than one SD from the norming groups, making him closed to information compared to the average president. Hermann (2005; see also Barber, 1965) notes that these leaders usually show signs of narcissism, enjoy the spotlight, push for even more extreme moves than the group may perceive are necessary, and are obsessed with their own success.

Trump's leadership style

His scores indicate that he is closed to information, challenges constraints, and is either task- or relationship-focused depending on the situation. These three characteristics suggest that his leadership style will vary between *expansionistic* and *evangelistic*. Expansionists focus on expanding one's power and influence or that of their country. This is somewhat puzzling though, compared to his espoused beliefs that the US should not expand its influence into other countries, but rather focus on increasing jobs and closing borders. It does align, however, with his past actions of signing unconstitutional executive orders and trying to expand his own power. Evangelists focus on persuading others to accept one's message and join one's cause, which might explain his penchant for performing before large crowds and extolling his own popularity. The variance between the two styles can be explained by examining how he interacts differently across audiences in the speech acts used in this analysis. For example, he directs most of his tweets to his supporters, and emphasises the need to increase America's power and status in the world. For most of his spontaneous interviews with the press, however, he directs his message to his enemies, such as 'fake news' reporters and Democrats, and

urges the public to support him. His scores indicating that he is closed to information mean that he is an ideologue and will interpret the environment based on his view of the world. According to Hermann (2005, p. 193), evangelists do not generally win any ‘most popular’ contests, which could explain Trump losing the popular vote in the 2016 election and why his approval ratings have never surpassed 50%, according to Gallup Polls. One related aspect of his leadership is the record-breaking turnover rate of his administration. Consistent with Trump’s personality profile, he fired Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Chief Strategist Steve Bannon, FBI Director James Comey, and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster when they opposed his foreign policies. He replaced them with more hawkish and like-minded advisors. The following chapter will overview his OCA scores.

Table 4: Operational Code Analysis of Donald Trump

OCA Characteristic	Trump’s Mean/ Z-Score	World Leaders	American Leaders	Rogue Leaders
P-1: Nature of political universe	.17/−5.4	.48	Mn=.44 SD=.05	.15
I-1: Approach to strategy	.38/−2.7	.60	Mn=.57 SD=.07	.35
I-5: Utility of means				
a. Reward	.18/+0.06	.16	Mn=.15 SD=.01	.15
b. Promise	.03/−.02	.08	Mn=.05 SD=.01	.05
c. Support	.35/−1.76	.53	Mn=.58 SD=.13	.31
d. Oppose	.15/−1	.10	Mn=.17 SD=.02	.28
e. Threaten	.06/+4.5	.02	Mn=.06 SD=.008	.07
f. Punish	.32/+5	.10	Mn=.10 SD=.02	.15

The results from the comparison of Trump’s OCA scores and those of world leaders and American presidents suggests that Trump’s beliefs differ significantly from the average. His view of the political universe (P-1) score is over 5 standard deviations below the average US president, making him almost unique in his conflictual and hostile view of others in the political universe. The index for this score varies between −1 and +1, with lower scores indicating that others are seen as being more hostile. Similarly, he has a more conflictual direction of strategy (I-1) than others, as shown by his score being 2.7 standard deviations below the norming group. Trump’s instrumental beliefs (I-1, I-5) reflect how he thinks he

and his in-group should exercise power, and although according to Table 1 in Chapter 3, his I-1 scores fall into the category of ‘somewhat cooperative’, they are put in context when compared to these norming groups. Overall, he credits more utility to conflictual (I-5def) rather than cooperative (I-5abc) tactics to achieve goals, although his Oppose (I-5d) scores align closely with American leaders. The most striking of his Utility of means (I-5) scores is how high Trump’s Punish (I-5f) score is, even compared to rogue leaders. At 5 standard deviations above the norming group, he is much more inclined to see punishment as a useful strategy compared to anyone in either norming groups. The most significant result is how closely his master belief scores align to those of rogue leaders rather than mainstream world leaders.

Discussion

Donald Trump’s LTA and OCA scores indicate a significant departure in personality and beliefs from other mainstream leaders. His distrust of others score is far greater than other leaders and offers an explanation for his foreign policy discourse, which emphasises other countries taking advantage of the US. It also offers insights into the high turnover rate of those working within his administration, as he is quick to remove anyone he sees as disloyal to him. Donald Trump’s repeated allegations that any news reports of his administration that criticise him are ‘fake news’ is an example of his hypersensitivity to criticism. Walker (2009) states that personality traits influence the formation and maintenance of respective belief systems, which explains why his distrust score aligns so closely with his hostile view of the political universe (P-1). His motivation towards the world, which focuses on eliminating threats, also complements this description. Trump’s in-group bias score, which is higher than the average US president and world leader, could help explain his proclivity towards adopting nationalistic foreign policies and fostering nationalist sentiment domestically. It is especially useful for filling in the gaps in explaining his decision to move the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem in the face of international condemnation, despite not receiving any concessions from Israel. His high in-group bias combined with his high need for power help explain his decision to sign an executive order instituting a travel ban from several Muslim-majority countries but exempting trading partner, Saudi Arabia. Both are nationalistic moves which were designed to resonate with his followers and increase his domestic popularity. His high need for power, characterised by strong, threatening rhetoric and disregard for “fair play” norms correlates with his conflict-oriented OCA scores for Utility of means (I-5). The fact that his master beliefs align so closely with those of rogue leaders could offer an explanation of why he forms friendships with leaders such as Putin and Kim Jong Un, despite them upholding seemingly irreconcilable ideologies. Structural theories of IR cannot offer a full explanation of Trump’s idiosyncratic behaviours such as this, which illustrates the utility of FPA. Trump’s Utility of means score for Punish (I-5f) is striking in that it is high even compared to rogue leaders. Combined with his hostile view of the political universe and high scores of distrust and in-group bias, this could explain immigration policy actions such as building a wall on the US southern border, reflecting his ethnonationalist desire to protect his

in-group and his belief that the best way to do so should be conflictual rather than cooperative. Trump's low score in conceptual complexity can offer insights into his transactional, zero-sum view of the world, which might explain why he sees the US as "losing" to other countries, hence his withdrawal from key trade and security agreements. What Donald Trump seems to be missing is the big picture. The US has long since agreed to act as a benign hegemon, one who absorbs security costs in return for geopolitical access and a world of states willing to cooperate. Every US president since WWII has regarded free trade as essential to US economic prosperity, until Trump. His personality traits and beliefs combined, help explain why he views international actors as "winners" and "losers" rather than actors mutually standing to benefit from cooperation, and explains his withdrawal from the TPP, which will ultimately cost the US economically and geopolitically.

In sum, there are alternative explanations for Donald Trump's foreign policy decisions, as nothing in the decision-making process occurs in a vacuum. For example, some scholars might argue that he is operating within a 'principled realist' framework, which acknowledges the centrality of power in international politics, identifies key US national interests, and asserts that cooperation among sovereign states, rather than multinational institutions, is the best hope for American interests (Powaski, 2019). Others might argue that the "hawks" in his inner circle influence his decisions or cite constraints placed on him at the domestic level. I argue, however, that his personality and core beliefs on an individual level, which interact with variables at several other levels, are the main source which guides his foreign policies and make him especially inclined to adopt nationalistic policies even if they are not in the long-term best interests of the country.

Limitations and directions for future research

Chapter 2 has demonstrated that the literature on nationalism currently suffers from several limitations, mainly lacking in breadth and explanatory power (Dekker, 2001). Moreover, nationalism is often confused with other national orientations such as "patriotism" and, therefore, lacks a consistent definition. Another limitation is the difficulty to measure different levels of analysis quantitatively, such as nationalism as an overall ideology, individual feelings and nationalistic foreign policy. Nationalism's lack of a grand theory and empirical studies have created a degree of epistemological chaos. An avenue for future research should focus on creating a clear conceptualisation of nationalism through sound empirical studies.

One of the challenges I encountered in examining Trump was that his style of speaking is very different than most leaders. Hence, I ran the risk of it not being accurately captured by *ProfilerPlus*. Many of his tweets contained grammar and spelling mistakes or incomplete sentences, and his spontaneous interviews contained repeated phrases or words which would not be identified by the automated system's dictionary and which, therefore, had to be sorted out manually prior to the analysis. A broader limitation using cognitive analysis is the causal weakness linking specific personality traits and beliefs to resulting foreign policy. I attempted

to strengthen the argument of causation by incorporating both LTA and OCA, which is an area for future research. Although Trump's scores, however, did correlate with each other, that may not be the case in other studies. Another option for improving causation, which was unavailable for this project, is including event data to the analysis.

Conclusion

In this article, I identified US President Donald Trump's leadership personality traits and operational code beliefs to answer the following question: is there a causal link between Donald Trump's personality and belief system and his nationalistic foreign policies? The overall aim of this research was to advance an understanding of the effect nationalistic leaders have on international relations. The specific research objectives were: (1) to identify a theoretical framework of nationalism which could be applied to the US case specifically; (2) to explore Trump's foreign policies and identify examples which could benefit from an FPA perspective; (3) to evaluate critically the relevant literature on LTA and OCA in relation to nationalism; and (4) to apply my research findings to the theoretical framework in order to connect Trump's nationalistic foreign policies to his individual personality and beliefs.

Upon identifying the need for an approach which links American nationalism and political leaders, I identify in Chapter 2 Trump's America First foreign policy agenda, which I argue is highly nationalistic even by American standards. By analysing his tweets throughout his presidency and a multitude of speeches, I aimed to address four policy decisions and behaviours which might appear puzzling without examining the individual leader themselves. Regarding the relocation of the Israel embassy to the contested area of Jerusalem, the data suggests that he identifies Israel as part of his in-group and was, therefore, willing to defy international consensus and US precedent. As for the withdrawal from the TPP, the results show that Trump views the world as a zero-sum game and is nationalistic enough to believe trade agreements infringe on American sovereignty. The executive order instituting a travel ban against Muslim-majority countries reflects his distrust of others, his hostile and conflictual beliefs, and his in-group bias. The fact that he excluded Saudi Arabia, however, could indicate that his own business ties include the Saudis loosely in his in-group. Finally, his deference and desire to form relationships with rogue leaders appears to be a product of his personality, which includes his self-image as the only person capable of taming adversaries. The results of this article reinforce the significance of individual leaders in foreign policy decision-making. Popular concerns relating to globalisation can be exploited by nationalistic leaders at the expense of other groups, as well as long-term US interests.

I have sought to establish in this article that the personality traits and beliefs of President Donald Trump account for some of the gaps in explaining his foreign policy decisions. My results find that he has a deep distrust of others, is highly nationalistic, with lower than average conceptual complexity, and a high need for power. Together, these traits indicate that his leadership style focuses on extending his power at the expense of others, makes

him likely to take risks and engage in highly aggressive behaviour, and concentrates on eliminating potential threats and problems (Hermann, 2003). His OCA scores indicate that his beliefs align much more closely with rogue leaders than mainstream ones, and that he has a much more conflict-oriented view of the political universe than the average leader. In sum, the fact that Trump has been an impactful leader cannot be denied. It will most likely take years and a wealth of studies to determine exactly what that impact will be.

Notes

- ¹ Washington, G. (1813) *Washington's farewell address to the people of the United States*. Hartford, CT: Hudson and Goodwin.
 - ² Trump, D. (2016) 29 November [Trump Twitter Archive V2]. Available at: <http://www.thetrumparchive.com> (Accessed: 10 August 2021). The Supreme Court held in *Texas v Johnson* (491 US 397) that flag-burning was symbolic political speech and could be expressed at the expense of the national symbol and to the affront of those who disagree.
 - ³ Albright made this statement on NBC's *Today* show on 19 February 1998.
 - ⁴ For a more complete overview of all eight leadership styles, see Hermann (2003).
 - ⁵ For a review of the evolution of early operational code analysis work, see Walker (1990).
 - ⁶ The data for rogue leaders comes from Dyson and Parent (2018).
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Appendix A

LTA Trait	Characteristic	Coding
Belief in ability to control events	Perception of one's own degree of control over the political world	Percentage of verbs used that reflect the actions of the leader or relevant group
Conceptual complexity	Capability of discerning the different dimensions of a complex environment	Percentage of words related to high complexity ("approximately", "possibility") vs low complexity ("absolutely", "irreversible")
Distrust of others	Suspicious, wariness of others outside one's group	Percentage of nouns that indicate misgivings or suspicions that others intend harm towards the speaker or the speaker's group
In-group bias	Perception of one's group as holding a central role, accompanied with strong feelings of national identity and honour	Percentage of references to the group that are favourable ("successful", "great"), show strength ("powerful") or a need to maintain group identity ("defend our borders")
Need for power	A concern with gaining, keeping and restoring power over others	Percentage of verbs that reflect actions of attack, advice, influence on the behaviour of others, concern with reputation
Self-confidence	Personal image of self-importance in terms of the ability to deal with the environment	Percentage of personal pronouns used such as "me", "myself", "I", which show that the speaker perceive themselves as the instigator of an activity
Task focus	Focus on solving problems vs building relationships	Percentage of words related to instrumental activities vs concern for others' feelings and desires

Appendix B

Personality Trait	Trump's Mean Score	Comparison	World Leaders	American Leaders
In-group bias	.19	Leans High	Mn=.15 SD=.05	Mn=.13 SD=.03
Distrust	.31	High	Mn=.13 SD=.06	Mn=.12 SD=.03
Power	.32	High	Mn=.26 SD=.05	Mn=.24 SD=.04
Conceptual complexity	.54	Low	Mn=.59 SD=.06	Mn=.60 SD=.05
BACE	.44	High	Mn=.35 SD=.05	Mn=.36 SD=.04
Task focus	.57	Moderate	Mn=.63 SD=.07	Mn=.62 SD=.06
Self-confidence	.40	Moderate	Mn=.36 SD=.10	Mn=.45 SD=.08